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NOTES
MANDAMUS IN MISSOURI: OLD
STANDARDS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The classic description of the writ of mandamus depicts the writ as
an order from a common law court to an inferior court, administrative
officer or corporation to perform a duty imposed by law." The origins
of the writ of mandamus lie in the ancient practice of English sover-
eigns of commanding subjects to perform specific acts.2 These com-
mands were issued as letters missive without intervention of the courts.3
By the time of Edward I the procedure had developed to issue such
royal commands through judicial writs addressed to specific persons.4
The writ issued from the court of King's Bench as an exercise of royal
prerogative.5 By the end of the seventeenth century the writ of man-
damus was in regular use6 in aid of the police power' to effectuate
justice where good government demanded a remedy. 8 When the writ
of mandamus was established in American jurisdictions, it lost its pre-
rogative quality and became an extraordinary remedy issuing under
standards similar to those developed by the English courts.
II. PROCEDURE
Procedurally, Missouri courts have regarded mandamus as an action
1. J. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 5 (3d ed. 1896). This particular
formulation of the nature of mandamus is attributed to Blackstone, see 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES * 110.
2. S. MERRILL, LAW OF MANDAMUS 2 (1892). For a detailed and informative
background on the early development of mandamus in England, see Weintraub, ENG-
LISH ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY PREROGATIVE WRIT: CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS,
N.Y.L.F. 478 (1963).
3. J. HIH, supra note 1, at 5. The original use of a "letter missive" was the
royal instruction by letter to clerics ordering the selection of a named individual as a
bishop.
4. F. FEmus, Trm LAw OF EXTRAORDiNARY REMIEs 219 (1926).
5. H. MOSES, LAw OF MANDAMUS 16 (1867).
6. S. MERRILL, supra note 2, at 2.
7. F. FERRIS, supra note 4, at 219.
8. H. MosEs, supra note 5, at 16.
9. J. HIGH, supra note 1, at 8-10.
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at law'0 issued in the court's sound discretion" in extraordinary situa-
tions. " The Missouri constitution empowers the supreme, appellate,
and circuit courts to issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus.' 3  The
technical procedures to obtain a writ of mandamus are specified in
Missouri statutes' 4 and court rules."' A proceeding in mandamus is
instituted in the name of the state by an interested party (usually called
the relator)' 6 to compel action by a named person (usually called the
respondent)17 whose duty it is to perform the required act.' 8  Any
private citizen and taxpayer may seek mandamus to enforce a public
duty.'9 When, however, performance of the duty is of special and
10. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969); State ex rel.
Walton v. Miller, 297 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. App. 1956); State ex rel. Kinneard v. County
Court of Jackson County, 17 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. App. 1929).
11. State ex rel. Breshears v. Missouri State Employees Retirement Sys., 362
S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1962); State ex rel. Wells v. Mayfield, 365 Mo. 238, 281 S.W.2d 9
(1955); State ex reL. Fielder v. Kirkwood, 345 Mo. 1089, 138 S.W.2d 1009 (1940).
12. State ex rel Horton v. Bourke, 344 Mo. 826, 129 S.W.2d 866 (1939); State
ex reL Dietz v. Carter, 319 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. App. 1958); State ex rel. Cook v. Kelly,
142 S.W.2d 1091 (Mo. App. 1940).
13. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 4 (as amended, 1970):
The supreme court, courts of appeals, and circuit courts . . . may issue and
determine original remedial writs.
See also M. VoLz, J. LOGAN, & C. BLACKMAR, 2 MissouRi PRACTICE § 2067 (1961), for
a discussion of the jurisdiction and venue of Missouri courts in issuing mandamus.
14. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 529.010 to 529.100 (1969).
15. Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.20 to 84.25 contain the technical rules to obtain mandamus
and Mo. R. Civ. P. 94.01 to 94.09 contain the rules governing the actual mandamus
proceeding.
16. England v. Eckley, 330 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. 1959). The normal denomination
of a mandamus case is State ex rel. (name of relator) v. (name of respondent). The
typical petition in a mandamus action should present facts to show that the relator has a
clear right to the alternative writ of mandamus. The relator should state the specific
relief he is seeking. Unless the relator is seeking mandamus to protect the rights of
the general public, the relator must show his special interest in the subject matter of
the suit. The petition should allege prior demand by the relator and refusal to comply
by the respondent. Finally, the relator should show that he has no other adequate
remedy. See MoBARCLE, MissouRI APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PLEADING & ExTRA-
ORDINARY REMEDIES § 7.20 (1963); M. VoLz, J. LOGAN & C. BLACKMAR, 2 MIssouRi
PRACTICE § 2068 (1961).
17. State ex reL William R. Compton Co. v. Walter, 324 Mo. 290, 23 S.W.2d 167
(1929). As a caveat it might be noted that the relator should join all necessary
decision-makers or face possible dismissal, as occurred in State ex rel. Kent v. Olen-
house, 324 Mo. 49, 23 S.W.2d 83 (1929), where relator's case failed in part because
only two members of a three-man board were joined.
18. Generally, however, mandamus will not lie against an officer after his term of
office has expired, State ex rel. United Bonding Co. v. Kennedy, 364 S.W.2d 642
(Mo. App. 1963).
19. State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44, 8 S.W. 1 (1888); State ex rel. Lovell
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss4/4
Vol. 1972:719] MANDAMUS
limited interest to the relator alone (as occurs frequently in a corporate
context), a relator might be required to show a more personal, pe-
cuniary stake in the situation. 20  A number of Missouri statutes make
explicit provision for the availability of mandamus to compel perform-
ance of a duty in stated situations, but in most cases the courts deter-
mine the existence of a duty based on their analysis of the law.2 '
The relator bears the burden of proof in a hearing for mandamus.22
He must show the dereliction of a duty clearly imposed by law. In
all cases the relator must show present or future injury from respond-
ent's failure to perform a duty.24 Prior demand by the relator that the
respondent perform his duty is not always required, but it is advisable
that the relator make a demand and obtain refusal in order to avoid
any difficulty in the hearing.25 The relator should also try to specify
as precisely as possible the acts required to fulfill respondent's duty. 26
v. Tinsley, 241 Mo. App. 690, 236 S.W.2d 24 (1951). See State ex reL Taylor v. Wade,
360 Mo. 895, 231 S.W.2d 179 (1950), where the state attorney general, as relator, was
held to be a proper party to enforce a duty to the public.
20. See State ex reL Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 489, 98 S.W.2d 677, 679
(1936); State ex rel. Black v. Wilson, 158 Mo. App. 105, 119, 139 S.W. 705, 709
(1911).
21. See, e.g., Mo. Rav. STAT. § 84.190 (1969) (mandamus may issue to compel St.
Louis city officials to furnish adequate facilities for Board of Police Commissioners);
§ 99.180 (1969) (mandamus allowed to require performance of contracts with a mu-
nicipal housing authority). For further examples of such statutes, see MoBARCLE,
MIssouRi APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PLEADING & EXTRAoRDINARY REMEDIES § 7.7
(1963); M. VoLz, J. LooAN & C. BLACKMAR, 2 MissouiU PRAcTIcE § 2062 (1961).
22. State ex rel. Manchester Improvement Co. v. City of Winchester, 400 S.W.2d
47 (Mo. 1966); State ex rel. Mining v. Davis, 391 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1965); State
ex rel. Benson v. City of St. Louis, 136 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App. 1940).
23. Cf. State ex rel. Porter v. Hudson, 226 Mo. 239, 126 S.W. 733 (1910) (man-
damus will not lie to compel performance of an illegal act). See note 38 infra
for a more complete listing of cases in direct support.
24. State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 98 S.W.2d 677 (1936); State
ex rel. McGarry v. Kirkwood, 423 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. App. 1967); State ex rel.
Black v. Wilson, 158 Mo. App. 105, 139 S.W. 705 (1911). See State ex rel. Weber
v. Vossbrink, 333 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. 1960) (mandamus will not issue where
the matter is moot).
25. State ex rel. Thompson v. Jones, 328 Mo. 267, 41 S.W.2d 393 (1931) (prior
demand unnecessary in the case of an important public duty). Cf. State ex rel.
Bluford v. Canada, 348 Mo. 298, 153 S.W.2d 12 (1941) (prior demand required).
26. State ex rel. Hart v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 820, 204 S.W.2d 234 (1947).
But see State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Kelly, 377 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Mo. 1964), where
the court to do justice in a case of great public importance amended relator's petition
and writ on its own motion. For an interesting contrast on court leniency in judging
the sufficiency of relator's petition and writ, compare Yefremnko v. Lauf, 450 S.W.2d
462 (Mo. App. 1970) (court rejected prisoner's personal petition for mandamus due
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Upon proper showing by the relator, the court may in its discretion2"
issue an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the respondent to per-
form the required act or to show cause why he should not.2" Failure
by the respondent to establish grounds for nonperformance will result
in issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering respondent to
comply.29 A lower court's issuance of a peremptory writ, however,
is appealable through ordinary judicial channels."
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRIT IN MISSOURI
A. General Background on Missouri Standards
Missouri courts have delineated the scope of the writ of mandamus
by repeated use of certain key standards.3 The foremost standard
to insufficient facts in pleadings), with State ex rel. House v. White, 429 S.W.2d 277
(Mo. App. 1968) (court issued mandamus, even though relator's petition inadequate,
based on court's own analysis of the record).
27. State ex rel. Phillip v. Public School Retirement Sys., 364 Mo. 395, 262
S.W.2d 569 (1954); State ex rel. Coffman v. Crain, 308 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1958);
State ex rel. Schulz v. Fogerty, 195 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. App. 1946).
28. State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 334 Mo. 771, 68 S.W.2d 50 (1934); State ex rel.
University Park Bldg. Corp. v. Henry, 376 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App. 1964). See also
State ex reL R-1 School Dist. of Putnam County v. Ewing, 404 S.W.2d 433 (Mo.
App. 1966), where the court held that a relator in a mandamus action is exposed to a
counterclaim from respondent.
29. State ex rel. Standefer v. England, 328 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. App. 1959). See
also State ex rel Kugler v. Tillatson, 312 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1958), where the court
allowed a supplemental writ of mandamus to issue.
30. See State ex reL House v. White, 429 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1968). Most
of the cases cited in this note are appellate court decisions reviewing issuance or denial
of mandamus by a lower court.
31. For a background on traditional mandamus in Missouri up to 1950, see Note,
Extraordinary Writs in Missouri, 19 U.K.C.L. Rav. 173, 178 (1950). One Missouri
statute, the Administrative Procedure Act, codifies some traditional mandamus doctrines
in reviewing certain administrative decisions, Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.150 (1969):
1. When an administrative officer or body existing under the constitution
or by statute or by municipal charter or ordinance shall have rendered a
decision which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal
rights, duties or privileges of any person, including the denial or revocation of
a license, and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review
of such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for . . . mandamus
. . . and in any such review proceeding the court may determine the facts
relevant to the question whether such person at the time of such decision was
subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled to such privilege,
and may hear such evidence on such question as may be properly adduced,
and the court may determine whether such decision, in view of the facts as
they appear to the court, is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion; and the court shall ren-
der judgment accordingly, and may order the administrative officer or body
to take such further action as it may be proper to require; but the court shall
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss4/4
Vol. 1972:719]
in determining whether mandamus will lie against a judicial, adminis-
trative or corporate official is that the writ will issue to compel per-
formance of a clear duty, usually articulated in the case of judicial and
administrative officers as a "ministerial duty. '32  The overwhelming
majority of mandamus actions against corporate officers are resolved in
terms of the presence or absence of a clear duty.3 For mandamus
actions against judicial and administrative officers, the courts utilize
additional standards to determine availability of the writ. The general
rule is that mandamus will not issue to control a discretionary decision
of a judicial or administrative officer.3 4  In only two exceptional cir-
cumstances will Missouri courts allow mandamus to control discretion-
ary decisions of judicial or administrative officers-to compel exercise
of discretion 35 or to correct an abuse of discretion characterized by bad
faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness.3 6 There are two additional stand-
ards which serve as an absolute bar to issuance of mandamus in all
cases. The writ will not issue against either judicial, administrative
or corporate officers if there is another adequate remedy or if relator's
right to the writ is doubtful.3 7 Thus, Missouri courts have three stand-
ards that support issuance of the writ; that is, mandamus to enforce
a ministerial duty, to compel exercise of discretion, or to correct an
abuse of discretion; and three standards which function to deny issu-
ance of the writ; namely, no mandamus to control discretion, to aid
a relator who has another adequate remedy, or to compel action where
the right to the writ is doubtful. Each of these standards is explained
individually in the discussion which follows.
not substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in such administrative
officer or body, and in cases where the granting or withholding of a privilege
is committed by law to the sole discretion of such administrative officer or
body, such discretion lawfully exercised shall not be disturbed.
32. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reorganized School Dist. No. 4 v. Holmes, 360 Mo.
904, 231 S.W.2d 185 (1950); State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. C-4 v. Black-
well, 254 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. App. 1952); State ex rel. Dunbar v. Hohmann, 248
S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. 1952); State ex rel. Folkers v. Welsch, 235 Mo. App. 15, 124
S.W.2d 636 (1939). See notes 38-59 infra and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion.
33. See notes 50-59 infra and accompanying text for further discussion.
34. See notes 60-76 infra and accompanying text for further discussion.
35. See notes 77-84 infra and accompanying text for further discussion.
36. See notes 85-103 infra and accompanying text for further discussion. See also
26 WASH. U.L.Q. 135 (1940) for background on abuse of administrative discretion.
37. The "adequate remedy" doctrine is described in detail in notes 104-113 infra
and accompanying text, and the "doubtful case" standard is covered in notes 114-120
infra and accompanying text.
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B. Mandamus to Compel Performance of a Clear Duty
Missouri courts have made frequent application of the rule that man-
damus will issue to compel a public officer to perform a clear minis-
terial duty.38  A recent case reiterated a standard definition that "a
ministerial act as applied to a public officer, is . . .an act or thing
which he is required to perform by direction of legal authority upon a
given state of facts, independent of what he may think of the propriety
or impropriety of doing the act in the particular case . ... 1 When
a respondent who is a public official admits in his pleadings that under
the circumstances he could exercise his judgment in only one way,
Missouri courts have treated the situation as a ministerial duty.40 Typi-
cal cases in which mandamus has issued to compel a judicial officer
to perform a ministerial duty include: ordering a trial court to grant
intervention in the case of an absolute right;41 requiring a probate court
to accept a person chosen by minors to serve as curator of their estate;
42
and compelling a trial court to allow a prosecutor to file an information
after an indictment has been held insufficient. 43  Representative of
cases requiring an administrative official to perform a ministerial duty
are the ordering of a village clerk to issue a building permit to a relator
who had met all statutory requirements, 44 the requiring of a drainage
district board to call an election meeting several years overdue" and
the commanding of a school district to issue a diploma to a child with-
38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb, 467 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. 1971); State
ex rel. Cole v. Matthews, 274 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. 1954); State ex rel. Heath v. New
Madrid County, 331 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. App. 1960); State ex rel. Dahm v. Goodin,
295 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. App. 1956); Retirement Bd. of Police Retirement Sys. v. Kansas
City, 224 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. App. 1949).
39. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 15 v. Baker, 472 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. App.
1971).
40. See State ex rel. Floyd v. Philpot, 364 Mo. 735, 266 S.W.2d 704 (1954); State
ex reL McCleary v. Adcock, 206 Mo. 550, 105 S.W. 270 (1907). Some observers
have regarded this rule as an exception to the general rule that mandamus will not
issue to control the discretion of judicial or administrative officers. See 26 WASH.
U.L.Q. 134, 136 (1940). This perspective arises because the courts have sometimes
phrased the "admitted in the pleadings" rule to say that "respondent could have exer-
cised his discretion in but one way." This phraseology might well be a convoluted
way of saying "ministerial duty" since a decision with but one discretionary possibil-
ity is a decision without choice, i.e., a ministerial duty.
41. State ex rel. Aubuchon v. Jones, 389 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1965).
42. State ex rel. Pinger v. Reynolds, 121 Mo. App. 699, 97 S.W. 650 (1906).
43. State ex rel. Downs v. Kimberlin, 364 Mo. 215, 260 S.W.2d 552 (1953).
44. State ex rel. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Hendrickson, 392 S.W.2d 481 (Mo.
1965).
45. State ex rel. Byrd v. Knott, 75 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. App. 1934).
[Vol. 1972:719
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out insistence that an unauthorized fee be paid.46  Missouri courts
have been quite generous in issuing mandamus to compel public offi-
cials to perform ministerial functions, often straining to define a duty
as "ministerial."'
Missouri courts show no such generous propensity in finding a clear
legal duty for relators seeking mandamus against private corporations
or individuals. Missouri courts very early in their history thwarted
relator efforts to obtain mandamus against private individuals, on the
rationale that the extraordinary writ will not issue against a person
holding no official or quasi-official station, lest it become an instrument
of oppression.48  The Missouri courts will find a clear duty sufficient
to justify mandamus against a private individual, other than an officer
or director of a corporation, only where the individual is a former public
or corporate officeholder who has sequestered important documents
from his term of office. 49 Similarly, Missouri courts have refused with
only one notable exception" to find a duty sufficient to justify issuance
of mandamus against a voluntary association. 51 With regard to issu-
46. State ex rel. Roberts v. Wilson, 221 Mo. App. 9, 297 S.W. 419 (1927). This
case is also an illustration of the rule that mandamus in compelling proper action may
rescind improper action. In this case the state constitution made free public educa-
tion the right of every student. An impoverished school district sought to make money
by charging a fee before students could receive their diplomas. Mandamus issued
to compel performance of the ministerial duty to furnish free education and conse-
quently had the effect of rescinding the improper policy.
47. An illustrative case is State ex rel. Downs v. Kimberlin, 364 Mo. 215, 260
S.W.2d 552 (1953), in which the court construed a statute with the wording "may
be substituted" to read as if phrased to say an information "must be substituted" with-
out trial court discretion. Hence, a ministerial duty for the lower court, rather than a
discretionary power, was created in the appellate court's construction of the statute.
For a suggestion that the allowance of mandamus to compel performance of min-
isterial duties by judicial and administrative officials and disallowance to control
their discretionary decisions involve much arbitrary application of labels to do justice
to the case, see Note, The Use of Mandamus in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. R.av. 346,
354 (1935).
48. See State ex rel. Lionberger v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645 (1880); State ex rel. Cooper
County v. Trent, 58 Mo. 571 (1875).
49. See State ex rel. R-1 School Dist. v. Ewing, 404 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. App. 1966);
State ex rel. State Sav. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Davis, 54 Mo. App. 447 (1893).
50. See Lysaght v. St. Louis Operative Stonemasons' Ass'n, 55 Mo. App. 538
(1893), which held that relators who had property interest in membership in a benevo-
lent association and were expelled without notice or a hearing had a clear right to
mandamus to compel reinstatement. But see State ex rel. Young v. Temperance
Benevolent Ass'n, 42 Mo. App. 485 (1890).
51. See State ex rel. Cook v. Kelly, 142 S.W.2d 1091 (Mo. App. 1940); State
ex rel. Schrempp v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 70 Mo. App. 456 (1897);
State ex rel. Young v. Temperance Benevolent Ass'n, 42 Mo. App. 485 (1890). The
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ance of mandamus against corporations, Missouri courts have found a
quasi-public duty in certain specific and limited situations. The most
frequent usage made of mandamus against corporations is to enforce
the statutory or common law duty to make books and records available
to stockholders." Even on this issue there is a split of authority, with
some cases holding that there is no duty to make books and records
available to a relator-stockholder who seeks them for an improper mo-
tive53 and with other cases suggesting that an inquiry into the stock-
holder's motive is immaterial to enforcement of the corporation's duty"4
or that every doubt should be resolved in favor of the stockholder. "
Another area in which Missouri courts have allowed mandamus against
corporations is to require performance of the corporate duty to hold
fair elections by compelling certification of appropriate election results
and making consequent entries in the minute book." An old line of
cases advanced the doctrine that mandamus would issue to compel a
corporation to perform a duty to the public imposed by statute, ordi-
policy basis for the judicial aversion against mandamus to control voluntary associa-
tions was articulated by one court as a desire to leave voluntary associations to make
their own rules in a free society and to avoid immersing courts in controversies akin to
whether a heretic was properly excommunicated from a religious order. State ex rel.
Poulson v. Independent Order of Oddfellows, 8 Mo. App. 148, 154 (1879).
52. State ex reL Koman v. Town & Campus of Alabama, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 292
(Mo. App. 1969) (affirming trial court's issuance of mandamus to make corporate
records available); State ex reL Watkins v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. App. 1956);
State ex reL Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co., 178 S.W. 298 (Mo. App. 1915); State ex rel.
Watkins v. Donnell Mfg. Co., 129 Mo. App. 206, 107 S.W. 1112 (1908); State ex rel.
Johnson v. St. Louis Transt Co., 124 Mo. App. 111, 100 S.W. 1126 (1907); State
ex rel. Wilson v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 29 Mo. App. 301 (1888). See
also Mo. Rv. STAT. § 351.215(2) (1969) which provides for a fine of $250 against
any corporate official who refuses a shareholder demand to inspect the company
books. In State ex rel. Aimonette v. C. & R. Heating and Serv. Co., 475 S.W.2d 409
(Mo. App. 1971), relator was allowed to recover the fine under § 351.215(2) in a
mandamus proceeding. The case also held the relator's attorney to be a proper
party to inspect corporate books. Another significant case concerning mandamus
against corporations is State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 343 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.
1962), discussed in notes 173-82 infra and accompanying text.
53. State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing Co., 113 S.W.2d 1061 (Mo.
App. 1938); State ex reL Haeussler v. German Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Mo. App. 354,
152 S.W. 618 (1912).
54. State ex rel. Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co., 178 S.W. 298 (Mo. App. 1915);
State ex rel. Wilson v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 29 Mo. App. 301 (1888);
State ex rel. Spinney v. Sportsman's Park & Club Ass'n, 29 Mo. App. 326 (1888).
55. See State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. App. 1956); State
ex reL English v. Lazarus, 127 Mo. App. 401, 105 S.W. 780 (1907).
56. State ex rel. Dunbar v. Hohmann, 248 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. 1952).
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nance, regulation or charter provisions. 57  These cases involved heavily
regulated industries, such as telephone companies or railroads, which
owed a duty of service to the public. The public duty doctrine devel-
oped in these cases, however, has not been extended to other types of
corporations."8 Thus, the only theory on which Missouri courts have
allowed mandamus against corporations has been to compel perform-
ance of certain limited and well-defined duties.59
C. No Mandamus to Control Discretionary Decisions of Judicial or
Administrative Officers
While Missouri courts have freely allowed mandamus against judicial
or administrative officers to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty, they have also strongly adhered to the rule that mandamus will
not issue to control the discretion of public officials.60 The ministerial/
discretionary distinction has traditionally been used in Missouri manda-
mus cases involving public officials, but has not been used by Missouri
courts in mandamus cases involving private corporations-mandamus
being issued against corporate officers only in certain recognized situa-
tions."'
Missouri courts have traditionally made rigorous application of the
rule that mandamus will not issue to dictate the discretionary decisions
of judicial officers. 2 The rationale behind this general rule argues that
57. State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Missouri Southern R. Co., 279 Mo. 455,
214 S.W. 381 (1919) (to direct the continued operation of a railroad spur line);
State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 262 Mo. 720, 174 S.W. 73
(1914) (to build viaduct for public street over rail tracks); State ex rel. Morris v.
Hannibal & St. Jos. R.R. Co., 86 Mo. 13 (1885) (to cease blocking public road);
City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 70 Mo. 69 (1879) (dictum) (to appoint
arbitrator pursuant to charter); State ex rel. Payne v. Kinloch Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App.
349, 67 S.W. 684 (1902) (to provide telephone service). But see State ex rel. Star
Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W. 91 (1901), which held that
mandamus will not issue to compel the making of a contract.
58. See note 57 supra.
59. While Missouri courts will allow mandamus against corporations only on the
theory that the corporation has a clear duty (discussed in text above), mandamus can
be denied against corporations on the theory of the absence of a clear duty or the
presence of another adequate remedy, see note 104 infra; or the doubtful nature of re-
lator's right to the writ, see notes 114 and 118 infra.
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Betts v. Megown, 89 Mo. 156, 1 S.W. 208 (1886);
State ex rel. Bismarck Grill v. Keirnan, 238 Mo. App. 507, 181 S.W.2d 798 (1944).
61. See note 59 supra.
62. State ex rel. Hudson v. Ginn, 374 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel.
Thompson v. Nortoni, 269 Mo. 562, 191 S.W. 429 (1917); State ex rel. Lancashire Ins.
Co. v. Rombauer, 140 Mo. 121, 40 S.W. 763 (1897). But see Parker v. Moody,
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the issuance of mandamus to control judicial discretion
would be inimical to the orderly administration of justice, and would
serve to lessen respect for the courts. Corrective actions brought
against judicial officers involve the idea of transgression, and should
not be resorted to for the sole purpose of obtaining a speedy hearing nor
for the correction of mere errors.68
The scope of this bar to the issuance of mandamus can be illustrated
by a sampling of cases. Mandamus has been denied: to control the
discretion of a trial judge in making procedural rules to govern a
crowded docket;64 to alter a trial court's decision limiting information-
gathering to interrogatories rather than depositions due to the advanced
age and ill-health of the person to be interviewed;", and to control a
probate judge's discretion in refusing to appoint decedent's sister as ad-
ministratrix ad litem where the sister had earlier waived her right to
be administratrix. 6 Nor will mandamus lie to compel an inferior tri-
bunal to issue a writ of mandamus, since that decision is a matter of
the court's sound discretion. 17  Thus, the general rule denying manda-
mus in cases of judicial discretion retains vitality in the contemporary
law of Missouri.68
In reviewing administrative decisions Missouri courts have with equal
vigor observed the rule that mandamus will not lie to control discre-
tionary decisions.69 An early case advanced the definition of a "discre-
tionary" decision and its effect in an administrative context:
When the duty is such as necessarily requires the examination of evi-
dence and the decision of questions of law and fact, such a duty is not
ministerial and, not being ministerial, the decision of a public officer
to whom the discharge of such duty has been confided cannot be re-
446 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1969), where the court found no insulated judicial discretioh in
a trial judge's delegation to counsel of discretion to select the site for a change of venue.
63. State ex rel. South St. Joseph Town Co. v. Mosman, 112 Mo. App. 540, 550,
87 S.W. 75, 77 (1905).
64. State ex rel. Taylor v. Bell, 228 Mo. App. 481, 69 S.W.2d 320 (1934).
65. State ex rel. Nichols v. Killoren, 285 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. App. 1956).
66. State ex rel. Burke v. Ross, 420 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. App. 1967).
67. State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 334 Mo. 771, 68 S.W.2d 50 (1934).
68. See notes 62-67 supra.
69. State ex rel. Whitehead v. Wenom, 326 Mo. 352, 325 S.W.2d 59 (1930); State
ex rel. Folk v. Talty, 166 Mo. 529, 66 S.W. 361 (1902); State ex rel O'Connor v.
City of St. Louis, 158 Mo. 505, 59 S.W. 1101 (1900); State ex rel. University Park
Bldg. Corp. v. Henry, 376 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App. 1964). The general bar against
issuing mandamus to correct a discretionary decision of an administrative agency was
incorporated into the standards for issuance of mandamus under the Administrative
Procedure Act, quoted at note 31 supra.
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viewed or reversed in a mandamus proceeding. 70
The classic rationale for denying mandamus to alter administrative dis-
cretion is that mandamus should not be the means of substituting the
judgment of the court for the judgment of the administrators making
discretionary decisions, lest the courts become the scenes of de novo
trials for every administrative decision.7 ' The general bar to manda-
mus in discretionary cases insulates a wide variety of administrative
decisions from court intervention, such as the denial of the writ: to
compel a city building commissioner to revoke a building permit for
insufficient parking where the building commissioner retained discre-
tion to make continuing ad hoc adjustments of building plans; 72 to
compel the state supervisor of liquor control to maintain certain records
which were not required by statute and which the supervisor had dis-
continued; 73 or to require a school board to move a school bus route two
miles closer to a citizen's home, since the sufficiency of transportation
was confided to the discretion of the board.74  Even though the relator
has suffered grievous injury, mandamus may not issue to unseat a dis-
cretionary decision. Thus, in State ex rel. Pickering v. City of Willow
Springs, mandamus was denied to compel a city to correct a stench cre-
ated by inadequate drainage.75 The bar against issuing mandamus to
alter discretionary administrative decisions has remained operative. 76
D. Mandamus to Compel Judicial or Administrative Officers to Exer-
cise Discretion
Though the general rule that mandamus will not lie to control judicial
or administrative discretion is entrenched, 77 Missouri courts qualify the
rule to allow mandamus to compel public officials to exercise their dis-
cretion. 78 With regard to judicial officers higher courts may require an
70. State ex rel. Heller v. Thornhill, 174 Mo. App. 469, 472, 160 S.W. 558, 559
(1913).
71. Id. at 475, 160 S.W. at 560.
72. State ex rel. University Park Bldg. Corp. v. Henry, 376 S.W.2d 614 (Mo.
App. 1964).
73. State ex rel. Kavanaugh v. Henderson, 350 Mo. 968, 169 S.W.2d 389 (1943).
74. State ex reL Rice v. Tomkins, 329 Mo. App. 113, 203 S.W.2d 881 (1947).
75. 208 Mo. App. 1, 230 S.W. 352 (1921).
76. See note 69 supra.
77. See notes 60, 62, and 69 supra.
78. See, e.g., Parker v. Moody, 446 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1969); State ex reL Great
American Ins. Co. v. Jones, 396 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1965); State ex rel. Pedrolie v. Kirby,
349 Mo. 1010, 163 S.W.2d 964 (1942); State ex rel. Case v. Seehorn, 283 Mo. 508,
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inferior tribunal to make a decision without directing the particular na-
ture of the decision. 79 Thus, a circuit judge who dismissed a condemna-
tion hearing after a preliminary determination that the action was
improper was ordered by means of a writ of mandamus to exercise ju-
risdiction to make a final determination of the case. 0 When a trial
court erroneously dismissed a case without deciding on the merits,
mandamus was issued to compel a hearing of the cause. 81
Similarly, mandamus is available to order administrative officers to
exercise their discretion without requiring a specific determination.82
Illustrative of the rule are cases in which mandamus issued to require
an administrative board to gather facts and hold a hearing on the merits
of relator's case 83 or in which municipal officials were compelled to ex-
ercise their discretion as to arrests or warnings in enforcing a Sunday
ban on liquor.84
E. Mandamus to Correct an Abuse of Discretion by Judicial or Ad-
ministrative Officers
The general rule that mandamus will not lie to control discretionary
decisions of public officials is further qualified by the doctrine that the
writ will issue to correct decisions of public officers which manifest an
arbitrary, capricious or bad faith abuse of discretion.", In the circum-
stances of an abuse of discretion the courts will take the exceptional step
of issuing mandamus to dictate that an appropriate decision be made.8
Missouri courts have defined arbitrary decision-making as involving
the absence of a rational justification for a decision 87 and have required
223 S.W. 664 (1920); State ex ret. City of Stanberry v. Smith, 172 Mo. 618, 73 S.W.
134 (1903).
79. State ex rel. Fielder v. Kirkwood, 345 Mo. 1089, 1093, 138 S.W.2d 1009, 1011
(1940).
80. State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 222 S.W.2d 64
(1949).
81. State ex rel. Monett Mill Co. v. Neville, 157 Mo. 386, 57 S.W. 1012 (1900).
82. State ex rel. Pedrolie v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 1010, 163 S.W.2d 964 (1942).
83. State ex reL Potts v. Travis, 241 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. App. 1951).
84. State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44, 8 S.W. 1 (1888).
85. See, e.g., State ex reL Kelleher v. St. Louis Pub. Schools, 134 Mo. 296,
35 S.W. 617 (1896); State ex rel. Corcoran v. Buder, 428 S.W.2d 935 (Mo. App.
1968); State ex rel. Reis v. Nangle, 349 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App. 1961); State ex rel.
Hultz v. Bowman, 294 S.W. 107 (Mo. App. 1927).
86. See note 85 supra.
87. State ex reL Doniphan State Bank v. Harris, 176 S.W. 9, 10 (Mo. 1915).
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that discretion be reasonably exercised. 8 Arbitrary decision-making
by lower courts is the most frequent instance in which mandamus is
sought to correct judicial abuses of discretion. For example, where a
trial court set aside a judgment without providing any reason, manda-
mus issued to correct the manifest injustice.80 Likewise, when a trial
judge held that a statute allowing an information to be filed within three
years of the offense required that the information be filed within six
months, his arbitrary decision was reversed by mandamus.90
While an irrational exercise of judicial discretion may be corrected
by mandamus, the traditional limit on the "abuse of discretion" justifi-
cation for issuance of the writ has been that an erroneous but rational
discretionary decision by a lower court is not subject to correction by
mandamus.01 As one court observed: "It cannot be tolerated that a
party may invoke the extraordinary writ of mandamus every time a
judge makes an error in his opinion. It was never designed that this
writ should usurp the function of a writ of error or appeal.""2
In reviewing administrative decisions the general rule that mandamus
will not issue to correct a discretionary administrative decision 3 is quali-
fied by allowing mandamus to correct an arbitrary, capricious, or bad
faith administrative decision. 4  Arbitrary abuses of discretion have
88. State ex rel McCleary v. Adcock, 206 Mo. 550, 556, 105 S.W. 270, 271
(1907).
89. State ex reL Diners' Financial Corp. v. Swink, 434 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App.
1968).
90. State ex rel. Corcoran v. Buder, 428 S.W.2d 935 (Mo. App. 1968).
91. State ex rel Springfield Traction Co. v. Broaddus, 207 Mo. 107, 105 S.W.
629 (1907); State ex rel. Hyatt v. Smith, 105 Mo. 6, 16 S.W. 1052 (1891).
92. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Field, 107 Mo. 445, 450, 17 S.W. 896, 897
(1891). But see State ex rel. Shaul v. Jones, 335 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. App. 1960), where
the court issued mandamus to correct a mere error of the trial court without distin-
guishing or clarifying the impact on traditional mandamus doctrine on the subject.
93. The classic aversion of Missouri courts to impinging upon administrative dis-
cretion is illustrated by State ex rel. Gehrig v. Medley, 28 S.W.2d 1040, 1043 (Mo.
App. 1930), where the court observed:
There is nothing in the admitted facts of this record tending to prove fraud,
collusion, or bad faith on the part of the board. No such claim is made.
The reasons set forth for failing to agree are plausible enough. Under such
circumstances there is no sufficient reason for calling upon the strong arm of
the law, and the courts should not tell the board of education of the district
that they must erect a building within a particular time and, in effect, upon a
particular site. To do so clearly invades the discretionary powers of the board.
94. See State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969); State
ex rel. Kelleher v. Board of St. Louis Pub. Schools, 134 Mo. 296, 35 S.W. 617 (1896);
State ex rel. Allman v. Deatherage, 120 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App. 1938).
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been frequent targets for correction by mandamus.9 For example,
mandamus was issued to correct the irrational act of a city director
of personnel who on his own initiative decided not to hire firemen, un-
less they had more than twenty natural teeth.9 Some cases have even
suggested that the failure of an administrative agency to conduct an ad-
equate investigation of relator's claim will constitute an arbitrary abuse
of discretion. 97
Administrative decisions tainted with bad faith have also provoked
frequent use of mandamus in Missouri. Illustrative of such cases is a
situation in which mandamus issued to prevent one city from deliber-
ately backing up the sewers of another city in order to compel increased
contributions for joint sewer maintenance. 98  A significant case demon-
strating the broad scope of the "abuse of discretion" principle is State ex
rel. Kelleher v. St. Louis Public Schools, where mandamus was issued
to prevent a "gross fraud" on the public when the St. Louis School
Board, empowered to make all rules governing the manner of electing
school board members, chose only Republican judges to conduct an
election in an emotion-charged, partisan atmosphere. 9 After vigorous
citizen protests and a Democratic proposal to place challengers at the
polls were rejected by the board, the court issued mandamus at the re-
quest of a relator to correct the "manifest injustice" of the board's abuse
of discretion. 100 In preventing administrative bad faith, Missouri has
narrowed its standards in only one area, by denying mandamus to an
unsuccessful bidder for a public contract who seeks the writ as a private
person to compel award of the contract to himself.' 0 '
95. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shartel v. Humphreys, 338 Mo. 1091, 93 S.W.2d 924
(1936); State ex reL Allman v. Deatherage, 120 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App. 1938); State
ex rel. Hultz v. Bowman, 294 S.W. 107 (Mo. App. 1927).
96. Kahon v. Scearce, 228 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. App. 1950). The evidence also
showed that a number of incumbent firemen had nothing but false teeth. Id. at 388.
97. See State ex reL Kugler v. Tillatson, 331 Mo. 1006, 312 S.W.2d 753 (1958).
But see State ex reL Kopper Kettle Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St. Robert, 424
S.W.2d 73 (Mo. App. 1968), where mandamus was denied although there was no
clear showing of an investigation by the agency of the facts behind relator's claim.
However, the court did remand for trial of facts. Id. at 80.
98. State ex rel Shartel v. Humphreys, 373 Mo. 1091, 93 S.W.2d 924 (1936).
99. State ex rel. Kelleher v. Board of St. Louis Pub. Schools, 134 Mo. 296, 35
S.W. 617 (1896).
100. Id. at 298, 35 S.W. at 618.
101. State ex reL Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 98 S.W.2d 677 (1936), which
overruled two prior decisions, State ex rel Journal Printing Co. v. Dreyer, 183 Mo.
App. 463, 167 S.W. 1123 (1914) and State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Bourne, 151
Mo. App. 104, 131 S.W. 896 (1910).
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The standard that courts will not disturb plausible, albeit erroneous,
administrative decisions made in good faith has prevented the "abuse of
discretion" doctrine from developing into a general justification for re-
view of administrative decisions through the extraordinary writ of man-
damus. 112  As the St. Louis Court of Appeals observed in 1964: "Fi-
nally it should be pointed out that relator admits that the respondents
acted in good faith. It would seem that such an admission would pre-
clude the charge of an abuse of discretion.' 10 3
F. No Mandamus Against Judicial, Administrative or Corporate Offi-
cers Where Relator Has Another Adequate Remedy
Even though the relator has established a case for the issuance of the
writ of mandamus against an administrative, judicial or corporate offi-
cial, he may be denied the writ if he has another adequate remedy.1' 4
The usual "other adequate remedy" is appeal through the courts,105 al-
102. State ex rel. Richardson v. Baldry, 331 Mo. 1006, 56 S.W.2d 67 (1932); State
cx rel. Gehner v. Thompson, 316 Mo. 835, 293 S.W. 391 (1927); State ex rel. Hager-
man v. Drabelle, 191 S.W. 691 (Mo. 1916). But see State ex rel. Wolfe v. Missouri
Dental Bd., 282 Mo. 292, 231 S.W. 70 (1920), where the court held that mandamus
would issue to correct the denial of a dentist license based on an erroneous construction
of law by the Board. The court did not specify what theory militated issuance of
mandamus. However, the element of arbitrariness may have been present, though un-
articulated by the court, since the Board had denied relator a transcript and had led
relator to believe there would be no adverse action pending relator's appeal.
103. State ex rel. Rainey v. Crowe, 382 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Mo. App. 1964). It might
be noted, however, that any "good faith" decision must retain an element of rational
plausibility, or the decision will be susceptible to attack by mandamus as an arbitrary
and capricious abuse of discretion. See notes 91-97 supra and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., State ex rel. University Bank v. Blair, 365 Mo. 699, 285 S.W.2d 678
(1956); State ex rel. Lamport v. Robinson, 257 Mo. 584, 165 S.W. 997 (1914); State
ex rel. Kansas City v. Kansas City Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515, 163 S.W. 854 (1913);
Sheridan v. Fleming, 2 S.W. 838 (Mo. 1887); State ex rel. Mary Frances Realty Co. v.
Homer, 150 Mo. App. 325, 130 S.W. 510 (1910). Illustrative of the possible harsh-
ness of the rule is State ex rel. Horton v. Bourke, 334 Mo. 826, 129 S.W.2d 866
(1939), where relator's license was revoked due to a bad-faith conspiracy of an ad-
ministrative board, yet mandamus was denied because of the other remedy of appeal.
105. There are several avenues of appeal of an administrative decision in Missouri.
In a "contested case" the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act provides for appeal
through the courts without resort to the extraordinary writs where a final administrative
decision has been rendered. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 536.100 (1969). A "contested case"
is a "proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific
parties are required by law to be determined after hearing." Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 536.010
(1969). For a discussion of the construction given by Missouri courts to the "con-
tested case" requirement, see 36 Mo. L. R.v. 444 (1971). In cases other than the
"contested cases" covered under § 536.100, Missouri allows resort to the extraordinary
writs. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 536.150 (1969). Missouri also provides for an intermediate
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though Missouri courts have occasionally considered appeals to the leg-
islature,10 6 suits at law,10 7 and exhaustion of appeal procedures within
an incorporated association'0 8 or in an election contest'00 as other "ade-
quate remedies". The reason for the "other adequate remedy" bar is to
reserve the extraordinary writ of mandamus for matters of great urgency
or public importance and thus to avoid the disruption of ordinary appeal
procedures occasioned by pushing cases ahead on the docket and forcing
appellate courts to weigh facts more appropriately heard in trial
courts."10
But two exceptions have been established to avoid the denial of man-
damus on grounds of the adequacy of another remedy. The first ex-
ception involves the issuance of mandamus, regardless of the right of a
party to appeal, when a trial court has failed to enter a judgment as di-
rected by an appellate court on remand."' The reason for this excep-
tion is the desire of appellate courts to avoid a futile round of appeals
by compelling the compliance of a recalcitrant trial court with the judg-
ment originally directed."12  The second exception lifts the "other ade-
quate remedy" bar only in the special circumstance when the other
layer of review in the case of certain administrative agencies empowered to license,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 161.272 (1969), with a hearing of appeals before the Administra-
tive Hearing Commission. The decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission is
in turn subject to judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act of chapter 536. Mo. Rlv. STAT. § 161.332 (1969). In addition to these routes
of appealing administrative decisions one statute, the Liquor Control Law, has its own
specific provisions for appeal and judicial review without resort to the extraordinary
writs. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 311.700 (1969).
With regard to obtaining review of adverse judicial decisions, Missouri courts
strongly incline toward insistence on use of the ordinary channels of judicial appeal
rather than resort to mandamus. See State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827,
123 S.W.2d 105 (1938) (mere fact that appeal is a slower process does not justify
resort to mandamus); Spring River Elec. Power Co. v. Thurman, 232 Mo. 130, 132
S.W. 1157 (1910); State ex rel. Herriford v. McKee, 150 Mo. 233, 51 S.W. 421
(1899); State ex rel. Betts v. McGowan, 89 Mo. 156, 1 S.W. 208 (1886). But see
State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 359 Mo. 402, 406, 222 S.W.2d 64, 67
(1949), where the court allowed mandamus, noting that appeal was an inadequate
remedy without further explanation.
106. See State ex rel. Gehner v. Thompson, 316 Mo. 1169, 293 S.W. 391 (1927).
107. State ex rel. Bornfield v. Rombauer, 46 Mo. 155 (1870).
108. State ex rel. Cammann v. Tower Grove Turn Verein, 206 S.W. 242 (Mo.
App. 1918). However, State ex rel. Schrimpp v. Ancient Order United Workmen, 70
Mo. App. 456 (1897), suggests, in dictum, a different conclusion.
109. See State ex rel. Nichols v. Schmontey, 418 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. App. 1967).
110. State ex rel. Dietz v. Carter, 319 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. App. 1958).
111. State ex rel. Stites v. Goodman, 351 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1961).
112. State ex rel. Robertson v. Kelly, 293 Mo. 297, 239 S.W. 867 (1922).
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remedy is not equally "effective"--that is, when the other remedy can-
not accomplish precisely the same results as mandamus.11
G. No Mandamus Against Judicial, Administrative or Corporate Offi-
cials if Relator's Right to the Writ is Doubtful
Missouri courts raise an absolute bar against issuance of mandamus
against judicial, administrative or corporate officials when the relator's
right to the writ is doubtful.'1 4  This standard seems to contemplate
that the respondent's duty must be clearly established in existing law for
mandamus to issue, as evidenced by recurrent maxims like: "manda-
mus will issue to enforce, not to establish, a claim or right" or "the office
of the writ of mandamus is to execute, not to adjudicate."'1 A typical
use of the "doubtful case" bar to mandamus is State ex rel. Powell v.
City of Creve Coeur, where the court refused to issue mandamus to
compel a city to furnish an itemized statement of the sum necessary to
redeem relator's property from taxes since there was no statutory duty
on the city to furnish such records and the relator's right to the writ
was consequently doubtful."16 Thus, the "doubtful case" bar to man-
113. State ex rel. Wells v. Mayfield, 365 Mo. 328, 281 S.W.2d 9 (1955) (manda-
mus allowed since appeal not allowable to correct improper interlocutory decree);
State ex rel. Yale Univ. v. Sartorius, 349 Mo. 1039, 163 S.W.2d 981 (1942) (manda-
mus allowed to order circuit judge to allow relator an appeal); State ex rel. Watkins v.
Donnell Mfg. Co., 129 Mo. App. 206, 107 S.W. 1112 (1908) (equity proceeding not
equally effective since inspection of corporate books under equity is only pursuant to
receivership hearing while mandamus allows more general inquiry into corporate rec-
ords). But cf. State ex rel. Herriford v. McKee, 150 Mo. 233, 51 S.W. 421 (1899)
(relator cannot escape bar of the "other adequate remedy" doctrine if he has lost an
equally effective remedy by his own negligence); State ex rel Scott v. Scearce, 303
S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1957). See also State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827,
123 S.W.2d 105 (1938) (mere fact that appeal is a slower process does not justify resort
to mandamus).
114. See, e.g., State ex rel. Breshears v. Missouri State Employees Retirement Sys.,
362 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1962); State ex reL Crow v. Boonville R.R. Bridge Co., 206
Mo. 74, 103 S.W. 1052 (1907); State ex rel. Pope v. Lisle, 469 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. App.
1971); State ex rel. Burke v. Ross, 420 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. App. 1967); State ex rel.
McGuire v. Hermann, 403 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1966); State ex rel Coffman v. Crain,
308 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1958); State ex rel. Hanlon v. City of Maplewood, 231
Mo. App. 739, 99 S.W.2d 138 (1936).
115. See State ex rel. Phillip v. Public School Retirement Sys., 364 Mo. 395, 262
S.W.2d 569 (1953); Yefremnko v. Lauf, 450 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App. 1970); State
ex rel. Walton v. Miller, 297 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. App. 1956). But see State ex rel.
Magidson v. Henze, 342 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. App. 1961), where the court held man-
damus could be used to adjudicate the constitutionality of a statute.
116. 452 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. App. 1970).
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damus poses a severe obstacle to the use of the writ in resolving difficult
legal questions. 1 17  The "doubtful case" standard has been used often
to thwart novel or innovative uses of the writ, especially against officials
of corporations or voluntary associations."" An occasional case has
even carried the "doubtful case" standard so far as to bar mandamus
where there is doubt about the factual basis of the relator's claim.110
However, one case, State ex rel. Christian v. LaWry, 20 explicitly rejects
rigorous application of the "doubtful case" standard to matters of dis-
puted fact in a mandamus action, arguing that relator's right to relief
need not be established "to the point of mathematical certainty."
IV. PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE APPLICABILITY
A. Change and Continuity-An Overview
The decade of the sixties witnessed three Missouri Supreme Court deci-
sions which seemed to challenge many of the traditional mandamus
doctrines previously outlined in this note. Two of the supreme court
opinions seemed to lessen former restrictions on issuance of mandamus
against judicial and administrative officers. Interestingly, a third opin-
ion, regarding mandamus against corporate officers, involved a tighten-
ing of standards. These cases and their possible consequences are ex-
plored in the following narrative.
B. New Doctrine on Judicial Discretion
In 1966 the Missouri Supreme Court decided a case which seems
difficult to reconcile with some traditional mandamus doctrines. The
case, State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, arose out of a suit
by Knight Oil Company as plaintiff for conversion of a check.' 2  The
defendant moved to require joinder of another party plaintiff, alleging
that Knight Oil Company had engaged in a joint adventure to share
117. Courts may be driven to strain construction of existing law to avoid problems
with the "doubtful case" bar. See note 47 supra. For a critical discussion of the
tendency of traditional mandamus doctrines to prevent courts from properly attacking
difficult legal problems, see note 202 infra.
118. See State ex rel Cook v. Kelly, 142 S.W.2d 1091 (Mo. App. 1940); State ex
reL Onion v. Supreme Temple Pythian Sisters, 227 Mo. App. 557, 54 S.W.2d 468
(1932); State ex rel. Lyons v. Bank of Conception, 174 Mo. App. 589, 163 S.W. 945
(1913).
119. i'ee Yefremnko v. Lauf, 450 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App. 1970); State ex rel.
McGuire v. Hermann, 403 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1966).
120. 405 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. App. 1966).
121. State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Mo. 1966).
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equally any sum recovered by Knight Oil Company in its suit.122 The
trial court ordered Knight Oil Company to be joined with the alleged
co-adventurer as joint plaintiffs.' 23 Knight Oil Company then sought
mandamus against the trial court to deny the joinder.' 24 The Missouri
Supreme Court issued mandamus, holding that the trial court had un-
lawfully exceeded its jurisdiction by abusing its discretion in ordering
joinder when, as a matter of law, there was no joint adventure between
Knight Oil Company and the party joined. 125  The supreme court
stated that it did "not construe the agreement as creating a joint adven-
ture" noting that "the mere participation in the contingent proceeds of
a suit is not, in our view [a joint venture]."' 26  Therefore, since no
joint adventure existed, the supreme court stated that the additional
party was not necessary as a matter of law, and the trial court had no
discretion to do otherwise than deny joinder.'
The case might well have been decided differently under traditional
mandamus doctrines. First of all, necessary joinder in a case of first
impression might have been held a discretionary decision of the trial
court with any error being correctable on appeal without resort to manda-
mus.l12 s Second, any "abuse of discretion" or "excess of jurisdiction"
argument would have to grapple with the trial court's contention that
it made a plausible and reasonable construction of the agreement be-
tween the parties as a joint adventure. 29 The supreme court was per-
haps sensitive to this point since it twice referred to the agreement "as
we construe it" and a third time spoke of the agreement as not being
a joint adventure "in our view.' 13° If the discretion of the trial court
were rationally based and in good faith, it would ordinarily be immune
to a charge of abuse of discretion in a mandamus proceeding, even if
the trial court had erred in its opinion. 3' Third, the writ of mandamus
would not ordinarily issue where the right to the writ was doubtful,
i.e. the function of the writ is to execute, not to adjudicate.' 32 The
122. Id. at 674.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 678.
126. Id. at 676.
127. Id. at 678.
128. See notes 62-67 supra.
129 See notes 91-92 supra.
130. 409 S.W.2d at 676.
131. See notes 91-92 supra.
132. See note 115 supra.
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Knight Oil court admitted, however, that there was no Missouri prece-
dent for utilizing mandamus to deny joinder. 33 The court had granted
relator leave to amend since relator had originally brought this action
as a writ of prohibition.'34 When relator failed to argue that an abuse
of discretion occurred, the court on its own motion advanced the argu-
ment.135 The five-and-a-half page opinion devotes one page to a state-
ment of the facts and four pages to its construction of the agreement
as not constituting a joint adventure.' 3 6  The court cites only two writ
of prohibition cases in support of its contention that mandamus would
lie in the circumstances of this case. 3' In sum, it might be suggested
that the court did a substantial amount of adjudicating to issue manda-
mus in this case, and that the relator's right to the writ was something
less than the "clear, unequivocal" one usually required to avoid the
bar of the "doubtful case" standard.'38  Finally, the "adequacy of other
remedies" bar might have blocked mandamus in the Knight Oil case.
It might have been argued the relator would have had a remedy on
appeal to correct any mistake of the trial court without resorting to the
extraordinary writ of mandamus.',3 9 None of these traditional manda-
mus standards were discussed or distinguished by the Knight Oil
court.' 40
C. New Doctrine on Administrative Discretion
Knight Oil might have remained an aberration but for its potential
for the future. The case was only cited for its holdings regarding joint
adventures until it was picked up and used again by the supreme court
133. 409 S.W.2d at 675.
134. Id. at 673.
135. Id. at 675.
136. Id. at 673-78.
137. State ex rel. McCarter v. Craig, 328 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1959); State ex rel.
Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73 (1956). Significantly, Missouri courts
have been willing to issue prohibition on the basis of very expansive definitions of
"abuse of discretion" and "excess of jurisdiction." See Note, The Writ of Prohibition
in Missouri, 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 511, 523-26.
138. See State ex rel. Phillip v. Public School Retirement Sys., 364 Mo. 395, 402,
262 S.W.2d 569, 574 (1953): "A litigant asking relief by mandamus must allege and
prove that he has a clear, unequivocal, specific right to a thing claimed. He must show
himself possessed of a clear and legal right to a remedy. [Citations omitted.] The
burden, therefore, rests upon relators."
139. See notes 104 and 105 supra.
140. State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672, 673-78 (Mo. 1966).
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as support for another mandamus case.'141  That second case, State ex
rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 42 repre-
sented a far clearer departure from traditional mandamus standards.
In this case the city of Joplin, pursuant to state constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, had approved a bond issue to fund the purchase and
development of a site to be leased to a commercial laundry. 143 Missouri
statutes required that before any such plan for economic development
could be implemented, a division of the state Industrial Development
Commission would have to extend its approval.' 4 4 This agency was
empowered to promote establishment of "industrial plant[s]."'145 The
Commission approved the proposal, believing that the laundry would
constitute an "industrial plant" within the terms of the statute' 40 and
verifying its belief by obtaining an advisory opinion from the state
attorney general. 147  The relators, laundry operators in the Joplin area,
sought mandamus to rescind the project, arguing that a commercial
laundry was a service business, not an industrial plant within the mean-
ing of the authorizing statute.148 The supreme court issued mandamus
to reverse the decision of the Industrial Development Commission on
the ground that the Commission had abused its discretion by errone-
141. The cases citing Knight Oil used it as a means of expanding Missouri doc-
trines on joint adventures.
142. 426 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1968).
143. Id. at 13. The relevant constitutional provision is Mo. CoNsr. art. 6, § 27:
Any city or incorporated town or village in this state, by vote of four-
sevenths of the qualified electors thereof voting thereon, may issue and sell its
negotiable interest bearing revenue bonds for the purpose of paying all or part
of the cost of purchasing, constructing, extending or improving any of the
following: ... (2) plants to be leased or otherwise disposed of pursuant to
law to private persons or corporations for manufacturing and industrial de-
velopment purposes, including the real estate, building, fixtures and machin-
ery ...
The relevant statutes are Mo. Rnv. STAT. §§ 100.010 to 100.200 (1969). The key
term "project for industrial development" is defined in § 100.010 as:
(5) "Project for industrial development" or "project", the purchase, con-
struction, extension and improvement of industrial plants, including the real
estate either within or without the limits of such municipalities, buildings,
fixtures, and machinery ...
144. Mo. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 100.010 to 100.200 (1969).
145. Id.
146. Mo. REv. STAT. § 100.010 (1969).
147. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1968). The opinion is Opinion of the Attorney General of Mis-
souri 179, March 29, 1966.
148. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1968).
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ously deciding "as a matter of law" that a laundry was an industrial
plant.149
The significance of the court's departure from traditional mandamus
doctrines and standards can be demonstrated by a comparison of the
court's opinion with traditional attitudes. Under the normal rule man-
damus will not issue to correct a plausible, good-faith exercise of dis-
cretion by an administrative official.'" This principle was reaffirmed
as recently as 1964 by the St. Louis Court of Appeals when it held
that a good faith exercise of discretion is immune to a charge of abuse
of discretion.1 ' In the facts of the Keystone Laundry case the ad-
ministrative officials made a reasoned and good-faith interpretation of
the phrase "industrial plant.' 1 52  There was no Missouri case law on
the subject.' 53  The Commission took the exceptional step of seeking
an advisory opinion from the state attorney general.5 4  This pattern
of behavior would seem to constitute good-faith, reasonable exercise
of discretion which would ordinarily bar mandamus. 5 Yet the Mis-
souri Supreme Court issued mandamus, arguing that "the good faith and
solemn belief of the officer should not be concerned where there has
been an abuse of discretion accomplished by disobedience of the law."' 0
While the court did not explicitly overrule the good-faith limitation on
issuance of mandamus, one commentator has suggested that Keystone
Laundry has by implication laid the good-faith doctrine to rest.'5 7
Another traditional mandamus doctrine which seems incongruous
with the Keystone Laundry opinion is the "doubtful case" bar to man-
damus. The ordinary standard is that mandamus lies to enforce, not
to establish a right-to execute, not to adjudicate.5 8 The writ does
not issue in doubtful cases.' 59 Yet in Keystone Laundry the relator's
149. Id. at 19, citing State ex rel. Knight Oil Co. v. Vardeman, 409 S.W.2d 672,
675 (Mo. 1966), for support.
150. See note 102 supra.
151. State ex rel. Rainey v. Crowe, 382 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Mo. App. 1964).
152. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1968).
153. Id. at 16.
154. Id. at 17.
155. See note 102 supra.
156. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1968).
157. 34 Mo. L. REv. 408, 413 (1969).
158. See note 115 supra.
159. See note 114 supra.
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right to the writ depended upon their contention that a laundry was not
an "industrial plant"--a question of first impression in Missouri
courts. 10 The supreme court noted that the only cases on whether
a laundry was an "industrial plant" were some Pennsylvania cases which
reached diverse results. 161 The court also recognized that there was
some difficulty in making a determination of what constitutes an indus-
trial plant:
We shall not attempt to define an "industrial plant" in a form which
would be applicable to all cases and situations. That would be most
difficult, probably misleading as applied to other facts, and perhaps
impossible ...
There may be a somewhat "gray" line of demarcation between the
boundaries of "plants for industrial development" and of those businesses
which are rightfully excluded.'6 2
Yet the court issued mandamus in Keystone Laundry without discussing
the "doubtful case" standard.
The Keystone Laundry opinion may also clash with the traditional
standards of the "other adequate remedy" bar to mandamus. The or-
dinary rule is that mandamus will not lie where the relator has another
adequate remedy.'0 3 In the Keystone Laundry case it could be argued
that the relator had an ordinary statutory remedy of appeal through
the courts, which would bar resort to the extraordinary writ.'6 4 But
the supreme court sought to deal with this contention by noting that
the "other remedy" doctrine has been modified to require that the other
remedy be equally efficient.' "' The court seemed to allude to a need
for the greater speed of mandamus over appeal when it stated, "[Tihe
discretion of the court with regard to the issuance of the writ is some-
times influenced by the 'public importance' of the matter."' 66  The
court seemed to be arguing that appeal was too slow a process if the
question were of extreme public importance. Thus, Keystone Laundry
160. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1968).
161. id.
162. Id. at 18.
163. See note 104 supra.
164. See note 105 supra.
165. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1968).
166. Id.
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does not necessarily clash with the "adequate remedy" doctrine. 1 7
The Keystone Laundry opinion may also represent a departure from
the traditional restraint of courts in avoiding substitution of their discre-
tion for the discretion of administrative officials. The general rule
remains that mandamus will not lie to alter a discretionary decision for
the policy reason that courts should not short-circuit the process of ad-
ministrative decision-making. 168  The guiding principle has been that
judges should not unseat administrative expertise and judgment in order
to substitute their own views and policy preferences. 109 These per-
spectives do not mesh with the pronouncements of the supreme court
in Keystone Laundry:
We must exercise our own judgment in arriving at what we think the
people of Missouri intended, and it is our firm belief and our ruling
that they did not intend thus to authorize city revenue bond projects
for the construction and financing of commercial laundries which, in
essence, are service businesses . . . . [S]uch a project would naturally
compete with local business, and perhaps do so with distinct advantages
in its favor.' 0
Though the court uttered these words in the context of construing the
constitutional provision authorizing the industrial development pro-
gram, 17 the court's attitude seems abrasive to traditionalist mandamus
sensitivities against substituting the preferences of the court for the de-
cision of an agency." 2
D. Retrenchment Regarding Mandamus Against Corporate Officers
In sharp contrast to the expansion of mandamus beyond traditional
doctrines in Knight Oil and Keystone Laundry, a third Missouri Su-
preme Court case in the sixties featured an explicit narrowing of the
scope of mandamus against corporate officers. The case, State ex rel.
Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 73 was the only significant supreme court
167. See note 113 supra. But see State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 343 Mo. 827, 123
S.W.2d 105 (1938) (mere fact that appeal is a slower process does not justify resort
to mandamus).
168. See notes 70 and 71 supra and accompanying text.
169. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
170. State ex rel. Keystone Laundry and Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. McDonnell, 426
S.W.2d 11, 17, 18 (Mo. 1968).
171. Id. at 18.
172. Observe the tone adopted by the legislature in its standards on issuance of
mandamus in the Administrative Procedure Act, quoted at note 31 supra.
173. 358 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1962).
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decision in the decade concerning availability of mandamus against cor-
porate officers. 174
The relator in that case was a shareholder and former employee of
the corporation seeking mandamus to enforce his statutory right to in-
spect corporate books and records. 17  The relator specifically de-
manded to see three tentative financial studies: the preliminary profit
and loss statement, the monthly profit analysis, and the detailed tenta-
tive balance sheet.1 7  The company argued strongly that these docu-
ments were confidential and that disclosure of the requested information
would jeopardize the company's competitive position. 177 The trial court
held that the requested documents were not "books" or "records of ac-
count" required by the statute to be available to shareholders.-78 The
St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed, interpreting the Missouri statute
as placing a duty on corporations to make all documents available which
would enable stockholders to protect their interests and holding that
mandamus would issue to enforce the corporate duty.179  The Mis-
souri Supreme Court reversed and denied mandamus, holding that the
requested documents were confidential tools of management, not within
174. Very few corporate mandamus cases ever reached the appellate courts of
Missouri in the 1960's, perhaps because the grounds for issuance of mandamus against a
corporation were few and relatively well-settled. For a typical case, see State ex rel.
Koman v. Town & Campus of Alabama, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. App. 1969).
175. State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Mo. 1962).
The Missouri statute which establishes a corporate duty to make corporate books
available to shareholders is Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.215 (1969) which provides:
1. Each corporation shall keep correct and complete books and records of
account and shall also keep minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and
board of directors; and shall keep at its registered office or principal place of
business in this state books in which shall be recorded the number of shares
subscribed, the names of the owners of the shares, the numbers owned by
them respectively, the amount of shares paid, and by whom, the transfer of
said shares with the date of transfer, the amount of its assets and liabilities,
and the names and places of residence of its officers, which books shall be
kept open for the inspection of all persons interested. Each shareholder may
at all proper times have access to the books of the company, to examine the
same, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the bylaws.
2. If any officer of a corporation having charge of the books of the corpora-
tion shall, upon the demand of a shareholder, refuse or neglect to exhibit and
submit them to examination, he shall, for each offense, forfeit the sum of
two hundred and fifty dollars.
176. State ex reL Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo. 1962).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 776.
179. State ex rel Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 343 S.W.2d 631, 640 (Mo. App.
1961).
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contemplation of the statutory duty to make "books" available to stock-
holders.180
The Missouri Supreme Court's decision brought to a close the tend-
ency of the St. Louis Court of Appeals to broaden the categories of
documents which a court could compel a corporation to make available
to stockholders by writ of mandamus. Six years earlier the St. Louis
Court of Appeals had held that the statute at issue in the Ralston Pu-
rina case should be broadly interpreted to extend the stockholder's right
to demand inspection "to all books, records, papers, contracts or other
instruments which will enable the stockholder better to protect his inter-
est and perform his duties as a stockholder.''1 s8 In the Ralston Purina
case the court of appeals was attempting to extend that interpretation to
encompass tentative management working papers, 8 2 but the Missouri
Supreme Court slammed the door on this trend. Thus, while in Key-
stone Laundry the Missouri Supreme Court broadly interpreted a stat-
ute to extend the scope of mandamus against administrative officers
beyond existing precedent, in Ralston Purina the same court narrowly
interpreted a statute to restrict the scope of mandamus against corpo-
rate officers and to reverse existing precedent.
E. The Effect of the Mandamus Trilogy
The effect on Missouri law of the mandamus trilogy is clearest in
Ralston Purina. In that case the supreme court explicitly constricted
the scope of mandamus against corporations. The mood of the court
seems to reflect the traditional reluctance of Missouri courts to allow
mandamus against private corporations, associations and individuals. 83
As discussed earlier, Missouri courts have limited mandamus against
corporations to enforce only certain well-defined duties and have sharply
narrowed the scope of those duties.184  The Ralston Purina case, there-
fore, represents a further limiting of the application of mandamus to
corporations.
180. State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Mo. 1962).
The court did not decide the question of the scope of the common law duty to make
books available. Id. at 776.
181. State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. App. 1956).
182. State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Mo. 1962).
183. See notes 48, 49, 51, 53, 104, 108 and 116 supra.
184. See also State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson County Med. Soc'y, 295 Mo. 144, 243
S.W. 341 (1922); State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Cowgill & Hill Mill Co., 156 Mo.
620, 57 S.W. 1008 (1900); State ex rel. Lawrence v. McGann, 64 Mo. App. 225 (1895).
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However, Knight Oil and Keystone Laundry present standards which
are not clearly reconcilable with traditional mandamus doctrines. It
seems reasonable to regard these two cases as anomalous. The key
problem is the impact of the two cases on the principles which govern
issuance of mandamus to alter judicial and administrative discretion.
It might be that the effect of the two cases will be limited to their pe-
culiar facts. Neither case has generated any further doctrinal break-
throughs. For example, cases in the 1970's continue to apply the
"doubtful case" bar to mandamus with unabated vigor.185 Likewise,
the "good faith" doctrine may still survive, as evidenced by a St. Louis
Court of Appeals decision in 1969 which denied mandamus to alter a
discretionary decision even though a town council had made mistakes
of both fact and law.'86 Yet the Knight Oil and Keystone Laundry
cases were both decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri. Both
stand for the principle that a discretionary decision which involves a
mistake of law, even on a case of first impression, can be altered by
mandamus-a principle which does not harmonize with traditional doc-
trines. 8 7  Certainly these two opinions by the highest court of the state
carry the potential for more expansive mutations of doctrine.
F. Projections for the Future
If the inclinations of the Missouri Supreme Court of the sixties re-
garding mandamus continue in the seventies, the least likely area for
sweeping change would be mandamus against corporations. The Ral-
ston Purina case manifested a mood of resistance to expansion of the
writ. However, Ralston Purina was decided in 1962, several years
before the doctrinal mutations which seem inherent in Knight Oil and
Keystone Laundry. It is still possible that a change of perspective will
occur with regard to the corporate duty to make records available.
The Ralston Purina case merely limited the scope of mandamus against
corporations based on the Missouri statutory right to inspect books, but
the case did not decide the extent of the common law right of inspec-
tion.'88 In an era in which there has been increasing pressure on gov-
185. See State ex rel. Purdy Reorganized School Dist. No. 11 v. Snider, 470 S.W.2d
805 (Mo. App. 1971); State ex rel. Pope v. Lisle, 469 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. App. 1971);
State ex rel. Powell v. City of Creve Coeur, 452 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. App. 1970); Ye-
fremnko v. Lauf, 450 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App. 1970).
186. State ex rel. Rock Road Frontage, Inc. v. Davis, 444 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. App.
1969). The case cited neither Knight Oil nor Keystone Laundry.
187. See notes 92, 102, 114, 115 supra.
188. State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 358 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Mo. 1962).
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ermient to make more open disclosures of matters formerly regarded
as confidential,18 9 it is possible that such pressure for greater disclosure
will extend to corporations. Many social commentators have expressed
suspicion of the tremendous concentration of corporate power which is
hidden from public view. 190 Perhaps this concern for greater informa-
tion on corporate power and practices will yet persuade Missouri courts
to broaden the common law right to mandamus to make documents
available. Perhaps there will even be a shift to align mandamus against
corporate officers more squarely with mandamus doctrines regarding
public officials. This view is articulated by Adolf Berle: "The corpo-
ration is now essentially a nonstatist political institution, and its di-
rectors are in the same boat with public office-holders."' 91
Another possible development in the availability of mandamus against
corporations in Missouri could emerge from the long-dormant public-
duty doctrine. As discussed earlier, Missouri law possesses an old line
of cases in which mandamus issued to compel certain regulated indus-
tries to perform clear duties.' 92 It is conceivable that this line of cases
could be revitalized and extended to corporations in general.' 9 3 One
might well imagine possible applications of such a doctrine issuing man-
damus to compel a corporation to comply with an anti-pollution stat-
ute, to order a private university to maintain order on its campus, or to
compel a corporation to comply with a national price freeze. To extend
this currently dormant line of cases would probably prove a contro-
versial step in which courts would have to balance the interests of pro-
moting corporate compliance with legal duties against the interests of
189. See St. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 9, 1972, at IA (news article of presi-
dential declaration of liberalized declassification procedures).
190. See A. BERLE, JR., Tim TwENTmTH CENTuRY CAPrrALisr REVOLUTION 25-60
(1954); C.W. MILs, PowER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE 110-39 (1963).
191. A. BERLE, note 190 supra, at 60.
192. See notes 57 and 58 supra.
193. The courts which developed the "public duty" rationale for mandamus against
corporations may well have anticipated future extension of the rule. See State ex rel.
Payne v. Kinloch Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349, 359, 67 S.W. 684, 686 (1902), where the
court observed (emphasis added):
[Tihe vital question seems to be always, whether a particular inference isjustified by the existence of a condition which precludes the members of a
community from negotiating for fair terms or forces them to dispense alto-
gether with the service rendered by the party complained of (although their
welfare imperatively requires that service), unless relieved by interposition of
the public authorities. Abuses of contract right must now and then be cor-
rected, and they will require correction more frequently as population grows
dense and commercial activities multiply.
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discouraging abuse of the writ by zealots seeking to harass private insti-
tutions.
Mandamus against public officials, however, is a far more probable
area of change. Knight Oil and Keystone Laundry seem to pose a po-
tentially sweeping challenge to the validity of traditional doctrines. To
make an administrative or judicial decision which involves an error of
law subject to correction by mandamus might greatly broaden the scope
of the writ. The traditionalist, viewing these two cases with deep sus-
picion might adopt Harold Weintraub's critique of the "mistake of law"
standard:
Illegality, as a term of defining unreasonable action, presents an attrac-
tive simplicity, standing by itself. Clothed, as it must be, with the
paraphenalia of administrative action, and exercised in a factual context
pursuant to statutory authority, it is somewhat less than easy to isolate
the point of departure from legality.194
Great numbers of administrative or judicial decisions would ordinarily
involve interpreting the law. 9 ' Traditionally most of these decisions
have remained outside the scope of mandamus, since mandamus would
not issue to alter a plausible, good faith exercise of discretion and since
a mistake of law was properly corrected on appeal through normal judi-
cial channels. 9" But the "mistake of law" standard of Knight Oil and
Keystone Laundry might expose traditionally secure discretionary deci-
sions to review and alteration by mandamus. In the end the tradition-
alist might envision the disintegration of the ministerial/discretionary
distinction resulting in conversion of mandamus into a generalized writ
of review. The traditionalist would eschew such a broadened scope
for mandamus as playing havoc with orderly administrative and judicial
decision-making. 19 7
Others would applaud a broadened scope for the writ, however, and
would charge that the traditional restraints on its scope are no longer
reasonable or coherent in application. As long ago as 1935 a com-
mentator on mandamus in Missouri suggested that the ministerial/dis-
cretionary distinction often amounted to the mere application of labels
194. Weintraub, Development of Scope of Review in Judicial Review of Administra.
tive Action: Mandamus and Review of Discretion, 33 FoRDHAM L. REV. 359, 373
(1965).
195. Id.
196. See notes 92 and 102 supra.
197. See notes 63, 71 and 110 supra.
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to achieve a desired result in doing justice to the case.198 One discus-
sion of the Keystone Laundry case suggested that the case merely in-
volved the maintenance of flexibility which has been characteristic of
the writ through the years. 199 One scholar, Kenneth Davis, has been
even more lavish in his praise of any shift away from traditional manda-
mus standards, calling for the outright discard of the ministerial/dis-
cretionary distinction which has heretofore served as the guiding stand-
ard in issuing mandamus to review administrative and judicial deci-
sions.10° Davis is critical of the fact that by traditional doctrines man-
damus issued when the interpretation of the statute was plain and the
duty was ministerial but did not issue when the question was uncertain
requiring discretion.201 He views Ihis situation as paradoxical:
The special skills which judges have by virtue of their training and
experience may be brought into play when the interpretation is so
plain that such skills are not needed, but may not be brought into
play on the difficult problems of interpretation when the judges' skills
are most needed.20 2
Davis sees the drift of modem law in mandamus cases as posing a fun-
damental choice between maintaining mandamus tradition and turning
to equity tradition.203  He argues forcefully that traditional mandamus
doctrines should be discarded as full of "useless historical intricacies. 20 4
He urges courts to turn to the reasonable standards of equity in issuance
of the writ.20 5 Davis would probably argue that bench and bar could
more effectively utilize a writ of review based on familiar principles of
equity, rather than a mutated mandamus which blends "historical in-
tricacies" with indeterminate new standards of "unlawfulness" or "ex-
cess of jurisdiction. '20 6
As yet Missouri courts have not decisively and irrevocably committed
themselves to any such sweeping alteration of the writ of mandamus.
The two deviating cases, Knight Oil and Keystone Laundry, may still
198. Note, The Use of Mandamus in Missouri, 20 ST. Louis L. REv. 346, 354
(1935).
199. 34 Mo. L. REv. 408, 413 (1969).
200. K. DAvis, AD , ImSATwE Lkw § 23.11, at 350.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 23.12, at 361.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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end up as mere aberrations without telling effect on the law. They
may create only a minor flurry and readjustment of standards, or they
may be the precursors of a critical realignment of the doctrines which
have heretofore governed the writ of mandamus. The ultimate future
of mandamus against judicial, administrative and corporate officers in
Missouri remains to be determined by the courts and possibly the legis-
lature of Missouri.2 7
207. For an example of one possible innovative use of mandamus, see Kleps, Cer-
tiorarified Mandamus Reviewed: The Courts and California Administrative Decisions-
1949-1959, 12 STAN. L. REv. 554 (1960).
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